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By operating an antineutrino detector of simple design during several fuel cycles, we have observed
long term changes in antineutrino flux that result from the isotopic evolution of a commercial
Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR). Measurements made with simple antineutrino detectors of this
kind offer an alternative means for verifying fissile inventories at reactors, as part of International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and other reactor safeguards regimes.
PACS numbers: 89.30.Gg 28.41.-i
I. INTRODUCTION
In the 50 years since antineutrinos were first detected
using a nuclear reactor as the source [1], these facilities
have played host to a large number of neutrino physics
experiments. About two decades later it was realized [2]
that the techniques and technologies developed for the
study of neutrino physics could also be applied to nuclear
reactor monitoring in the context of nuclear safeguards.
This capability was demonstrated by several later physics
experiments [3, 4]. More recently it has been pointed out
that the field of antineutrino detection has matured suf-
ficiently to envisage the deployment of practical devices
dedicated to reactor safeguards [5].
Safeguards agencies, such as the IAEA, use an ensem-
ble of procedures and technologies to detect diversion
of fissile materials from civil nuclear fuel cycle facilities
into weapons programs. Nuclear reactors generate up
to several hundreds of kilograms of plutonium per year,
and are thus an especially important part of this cycle,
as it is here that plutonium is produced. Current safe-
guards practice at reactors is focused upon tracking fuel
assemblies through item accountancy and surveillance,
and does not typically include direct measurements of fis-
sile inventory. While containment and surveillance prac-
tices are considered effective, they are also costly and
time consuming for both the agency and the reactor op-
erator.
∗Current Address: Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory,
7000 East Ave., Livermore, CA 94550; Electronic address:
nbowden@llnl.gov
In this paper, we describe how we observe the effect of
fuel evolution upon the rate at which the reactor emits
antineutrinos. This data was acquired using a simple, ro-
bust, and nonintrusive detector, “SONGS1” [6, 7], which
we have installed at a commercial nuclear power reactor.
Observing this evolution with an antineutrino detector
allows limits to be placed upon the fissile inventory of
the reactor, in particular the amount of 235U consumed
and 239Pu produced.
II. ANTINEUTRINO PRODUCTION IN
REACTORS
A. Antineutrino Production Rate
Antineutrino emission by nuclear reactors arises from
the beta decay of neutron-rich fragments produced in
heavy element fissions. On average, fission is followed by
the production of approximately six antineutrinos, which
emerge from the core isotropically and effectively with-
out attenuation. Furthermore, the average number of
detectable antineutrinos produced per fission is signifi-
cantly different for the two major fissile elements, 235U
and 239Pu. Hence, as the core evolves and the relative
mass fractions and fission rates of 235U and 239Pu change,
the number of detected antineutrinos will also change.
This relation between the mass fractions of fissile iso-
topes and the detectable antineutrino flux is known as
the burnup effect, and has been observed consistently in
previous neutrino physics experiments [8].
To evaluate the antineutrino production rate we begin
by considering the key operational parameter of a reac-
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FIG. 1: The predicted (a) fission rates for the four main
fissioning isotopes and (b) antineutrino detection rate in
SONGS1 throughout a 650 day reactor equilibrium fuel cycle.
tor, the thermal power Pth;
Pth =
∑
i
Fi · E
f
i , (1)
where Fi is the fission rate for isotope i and E
f
i is the
average energy released per fission for this isotope. The
sum runs over all fissioning isotopes. However, in prac-
tice it is sufficient to consider only the four dominant
fissioning isotopes 235U, 238U, 239Pu and 241Pu, which
account for ≈ 99.9% of fissions in a typical reactor.
Following the formulation of [9], it is useful to define
the power fractions contributed by each isotope as:
fi =
Fi ·E
f
i
Pth
. (2)
Even with the reactor operated at constant thermal
power these fractions are time-dependent, changing by
several tens of percent throughout a typical cycle as, for
example, 235U is consumed and 239Pu is produced by
neutron capture on 238U.
Using tabulated values of the antineutrino production
number densities [9] for each fissioning isotope, we can
express the total antineutrino emission rate, nν¯ , in terms
of the thermal power and the power fractions:
nν¯(t) = Pth(t)
∑
i
fi(t)
Efi
∫
dEν¯φi(Eν¯), (3)
where the explicit time dependence of the power fractions
and, possibly, the thermal power are noted. Here, φ(Eν¯),
is the antineutrino energy dependent number density per
MeV and fission for the ith isotope.
B. Antineutrino Detection Rate
Antineutrinos are detected via the inverse beta decay
process on quasi-free protons in hydrogenous scintillator:
ν¯e + p→ e
++ n. The number of antineutrinos produced
per unit energy varies with isotope above the 1.8 MeV
threshold for this reaction, so that the antineutrino de-
tection rate will also vary as the fuel composition of a
reactor evolves. This relation between fissile plutonium
and uranium content and the antineutrino detection rate
provides a means by which to use these particles to pro-
vide information relevant to reactor safeguards.
To derive the antineutrino detection rate Nν¯ , we must
fold the energy dependent inverse beta cross section,
σ(Eν¯), and detector efficiency, ǫ(Eν¯), into the integral
of Eq. 3:
Nν¯(t) =
(
Np
4πD2
)
Pth(t)
∑
i
fi(t)
Efi
∫
dEν¯σφiǫ, (4)
The prefactor includes Np, the number of target protons
in the active volume of the detector, and D, the distance
from the detector to the center of the reactor core.
Following the formulation of [3], it is instructive to
rewrite Eq. 4 as:
Nν¯(t) = γ (1 + k(t))Pth(t), (5)
where γ is a constant encompassing all non varying terms
(e.g. detector size, detector/core geometry), and k(t) de-
scribes the change in the antineutrino flux due to changes
in the reactor fuel composition. γ is chosen so that the
value of k at the beginning of a reactor fuel cycle is zero.
Typically, commercial reactors are operated at con-
stant thermal power, independent of the ratio of fission
rates from each isotope. Operating in this mode, the fac-
tor k – and therefore the antineutrino detection rate Nν¯–
decreases by about 0.1 over the course of a reactor fuel
cycle, depending on the initial fuel loading and operat-
ing history. The magnitude of this burnup effect can be
predicted at the few percent level in an absolute sense,
if the reactor fuel loading and power history are known.
Much of the uncertainty arises from systematic shifts in
measured antineutrino energy densities φi(Eν¯), so that
the relative uncertainty in the predicted burnup rate can
be considerably smaller.
C. Reactor Simulation and Fission and
Antineutrino Detection Rate Prediction
In order to predict k(t), and thus the evolution of the
detected antineutrino rate, for the SONGS Unit 2 reactor
we used the ORIGEN/SCALE simulation package [13] to
predict the fission rates per isotope throughout a typical
reactor fuel cycle. At discrete steps, the simulation re-
turns the mass, fission rate, and number densities of fis-
sile isotopes in each fuel assembly of the core. The per as-
sembly fission rates are summed over the core to produce
an estimate of the reactor evolution history (Fig. 1a).
3The input fuel isotopics for this simulation are taken
from the San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station Final
Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) [14]. This report de-
scribes a nominal fuel loading which differs by a few per-
cent from the actual fuel load in recent cycles. While this
difference will lead to a systematic shift in our predicted
count rate from the true count rate, the FSAR isotopics
are sufficient for comparison with our current data, and
have the important advantage of being publicly available
and not subject to use restrictions by the utility.
To predict the antineutrino detection rate, the fission
rates are folded with measured or estimated antineu-
trino energy densities, the inverse beta interaction cross-
section, and an estimate of the detector response func-
tion. The antineutrino energy densities are provided from
1.8 MeV to 10 MeV in 0.5 MeV steps in [15] and [16].
Various parameterizations exist for this data [9, 12]. In
our parametrization, we used a cubic interpolation be-
tween adjacent data points to extract the densities and
errors at intervening energies.
We predict a change in the detected antineutrino rate
of about 0.5%/month (Fig. 1b) for SONGS Unit 2, and
a thus a decrease in rate of 10% over the course of the
entire fuel cycle. Similarly, we expect a step increase in
the detection rate of this amount after reactor refueling,
when spent fuel laden with 239Pu is removed and replaced
with fuel containing only 235U and 238U.
III. ANTINEUTRINO RATE MEASUREMENTS
FOR FISSILE INVENTORY SAFEGUARDS
As shown in Eq. 5, the time dependence of the an-
tineutrino detection rate also depends on the evolution
of both the thermal power and the core isotopics. As
a consequence, an independent measurement of Pth(t)
is required if antineutrino detection rate measurements
alone are used to constrain reactor fissile inventory. In
this case, the inspector would require access to the reac-
tor power history.
Used in concert with operator declarations, antineu-
trino rate measurements may be of considerable safe-
guards value. Declarations of fresh and spent fuel and op-
erating history, whose self-consistency is already checked
as part of the IAEA regime, must now in addition be con-
sistent with the slow change in antineutrino rate through-
out each cycle (“slope” changes) and the sharp increase in
rate observed following refueling (“step” changes). More-
over, for reactors which have proceeded through several
refueling cycles, a standard operating history emerges, so
that a comparison of slope and step between cycles offers
additional confirmation of standard operation. This lat-
ter type of comparison is slightly different than verifica-
tion within a single cycle, inasmuch as it is less dependent
on year-to-year operation declarations.
It is also interesting to note that the detected antineu-
trino energy spectrum is different for the two main fis-
sioning isotopes. This means that a completely indepen-
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FIG. 2: A cut away diagram of the detector, showing the
major subsystems.
dent estimate of fissile content can be derived from the
antineutrino energy spectrum without relying on opera-
tor declarations [9].
The requirements for a detector capable of making
such a spectral measurement would be considerably more
stringent than is the case for a rate measurement. For
example, excellent counting statistics would be required
in the high energy region (7 − 9 MeV), necessitating a
more efficient and/or larger detector, as well a good en-
ergy calibration across the entire energy range. We ex-
pect it would be difficult to design a detector with these
additional features, while still preserving the operational
simplicity and low cost of our current design.
IV. THE SONGS1 DETECTOR
The SONGS1 detector (Fig. 2) has been described in
detail elsewhere [6]. SONGS1 comprises a central target
region, a ≈ 0.5 m thick layer of passive shielding, and
a plastic scintillator muon veto. The target comprises
≈ 0.64 tons of gadolinium (Gd) loaded liquid scintilla-
tor [10] contained in 4 stainless steel cells each of which
is readout by two Photo Multiplier Tubes (PMTs).
The positron (e+) and neutron (n) produced by the
inverse beta interaction are detected in close time coin-
cidence, allowing strong rejection of the much more fre-
quent single event backgrounds due to natural radioac-
tivity or cosmic ray backgrounds. The incorporation of
Gd in the liquid scintillator greatly aids this rejection by
decreasing the neutron capture time to 28 µs, compared
to ≈ 200 µs for capture on hydrogen.
Unfortunately, this reaction is not the only means by
which correlated pairs of interactions can be produced
in the scintillator. For example, cosmic ray muons can
produce fast neutrons in the material surrounding the de-
tector – these neutrons can slow due to elastic collisions
with protons, whose recoils are detected by the scintilla-
4tor, and then capture on Gd with the characteristic 28 µs
time constant. Such processes are referred to as corre-
lated backgrounds. It is for this reason that SONGS1 in-
corporates a muon veto system. The random coincidence
of two unrelated single background interactions (gamma
rays or neutrons) can also occur within the short time
characteristic of neutron captures on Gd. The statistical
rejection of these uncorrelated backgrounds is described
in Sec. VA, while the passive shielding incorporated into
SONGS1 reduces the frequency with which these occur.
A Data Acquisition System (DAQ) based upon stan-
dard NIM and VME electronics modules records timing
and PMT amplitude information. A trigger is gener-
ated when the signals from the two PMTs on a cell ex-
ceed an ≈ 1.5 MeV threshold and no hit was recorded
in the muon veto in the preceding 20 µs. On a trigger,
ADCs record the amplitude of all 8 PMTs and Time-
to-Amplitude Converter (TAC) pulses corresponding to
the time to last trigger (interevent time) and the time
since last hit in the muon veto (or, because of hardware
limitations, the time since the last trigger, whichever is
less).
We estimate the detection efficiency of the complete
SONGS1 detector system, including the DAQ, to be
10.7± 1.5%. When combined with the expected antineu-
trino interaction rate (3800± 440/day) at the beginning
of cycle, this yields an expected antineutrino detection
rate of 407± 75 /day.
SONGS1 is located in the tendon gallery of the Unit 2
reactor at the San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station
(SONGS). This is an ideal location, since it places the de-
tector as close to the reactor core as possible (24.5±1 m)
while remaining outside containment, away from regular
plant operations, and about 10 m below the surface which
attenuates correlated background generating cosmic ray
muons.
V. DATA ANALYSIS
A. Antineutrino Event Selection
Again, the details of the event selection have been
described in detail elsewhere [6]. The analysis begins
by forming consecutive triggers streamed to disk by the
DAQ into events pairs (the two halves of which are de-
noted “prompt” and “delayed”). The raw data thus
formed comprises prompt and delayed PMT amplitudes,
the time between the prompt and delayed events, and
the time between the prompt event and the last muon to
traverse the veto.
An online calibration is performed using a spectral
feature due to the 2.6 MeV 208Tl gamma ray from the
thorium chain, which originates from the material sur-
rounding the detector. In our relatively small detector,
this feature will be shifted lower in energy due to escape
of some of the gamma energy. We have used an MC-
NPX [11] simulation to estimate this shift as 0.21 MeV,
such that the 2.6 MeV peak would appear at 2.39 MeV.
Setting the analysis threshold at this peak in the energy
spectrum reduces the impact of calibration uncertainties,
since no extrapolation in the energy scale is needed.
Table I lists the selection cuts that are then applied to
extract candidate antineutrino events (correlated events).
These cuts are applied to each scintillator cell sepa-
rately so that each is considered an independent detector.
While this results in an ≈ 10% loss of detector efficiency,
it allows for a more simple and flexible analysis. A brief
description of each cut is given below:
• PMT ratio cut : A cut on the ratio of the light seen
by the two PMTs on a cell,
r =
∣∣∣∣PMTA − PMTBPMTA + PMTB
∣∣∣∣ < 0.4, (6)
is enforced. This is to ensure that energy deposi-
tions that occur much closer to one PMT than the
other, and that hence have an atypically large light
collection efficiency, are excluded.
• Prompt energy cut : The prompt energy threshold
is placed at the calibration point, 2.39 MeV, so that
no extrapolation in energy is required. No events
are admitted beyond 9 MeV as it is expected, and
observed, that there are very few antineutrino in-
teractions above this energy.
• Delayed energy cut : The delayed energy threshold
is placed at 3.50 MeV. This threshold is optimized
to keep the number of uncorrelated events as low
as possible, which requires a high threshold, while
still staying as close as possible to the 2.39 MeV
calibration peak to reduce calibration uncertain-
ties. Events with delayed energy of greater than
10 MeV are also excluded, as the predicted delayed
energy spectrum is zero beyond this energy.
• Time since last muon cut : Event pairs closer in
time to a muon than 100 µs are excluded, since
these have a high likelihood of having been pro-
duced by the muon.
It should be noted that we apply a stricter PMT ratio
cut (less than 0.1) when performing the online calibra-
tion. While this samples a smaller volume of the cell
than the general event selection, it improves the reliabil-
ity with which the calibration peak can be found. We are
aware of no effect which alters the relative calibrations
between these two volumes. For example, examination
of the relative number of events passing the prompt and
delayed energy cuts with these two ratio values (Fig. 3)
shows little time dependent variation.
Next, an interevent time spectrum is populated using
events that pass all selection cuts (Fig 4). Two clear ex-
ponential features are seen, one due to correlated events
with a time constant equal to the neutron capture time
of the Gd loaded liquid scintillator (≈ 28 µs) and the
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FIG. 3: The fraction of the prompt events used for calibration
that also pass the more strict antineutrino analysis cut (cali-
bration employs a PMT ratio cut of 0.4 while analysis employs
0.1). The variation in this fraction over the 18 month data
taking period is less than 2%.
TABLE I: List of selection cuts applied to extract candidate
antineutrino events.
Cut Lower Limit Upper Limit
PMT ratio - 0.4
Prompt Energy 2.39 MeV 9 MeV
Delayed Energy 3.50 MeV 10 MeV
Time since last muon 100 µs
other due to accidental coincidences between two suc-
cessive uncorrelated events, with time constant equal to
the inverse of the detector trigger rate. Event by event
these two classes cannot be distinguished, so we employ
a statistical separation, fitting the interevent time spec-
trum to the sum of two exponentials. Simple exponential
integrals then yield the number of events in each class.
For this analysis we consider data acquired during an
18 month period beginning in June of 2005 and end-
ing in November of 2006. This period encompasses the
FIG. 4: A representative interevent time spectrum, displaying
the two expected exponential features associated with corre-
lated and uncorrelated events.
last 7 months of the SONGS Unit 2 Fuel Cycle 13, a
3.5 month refueling outage, and the first 6 months of the
SONGS Unit 2 Fuel Cycle 14. We choose an integra-
tion time of 30 days per data point, since we expect the
change in rate due to burnup over this period to be less
than 1%.
The data presented in this paper is from three of our
four cells. The excluded cell was found to have unaccept-
ably large fluctuations in the energy calibration, of order
0.15 MeV. These fluctuations are not fully understood,
but are thought to be due to a failure of one or more of
the gas-filled internal reflectors.
B. Detector Stability
Since we seek to observe a change in the antineutrino
detection rate relative to that at the beginning of the re-
actor fuel cycle, the stability of our detector response is
of paramount importance. We rely on the automated en-
ergy calibration to account for any time dependent vari-
ations in the gain of the scintillator/PMT/DAQ system,
since an error in energy scale will result in a change in
the threshold applied during event selection.
Examination of the variation of the number
events passing the prompt and delayed energy cuts
(Fig. 5(a)&(b)) allows us to estimate the effectiveness of
this approach. Given that the background radioactivity
that produces the vast majority of events in the detector
is essentially constant, we would expect this number
to remain constant if our single point calibration of
the background gamma line were completely effective.
Instead we observe small variations, implying that there
is indeed some uncorrected drift in the energy calibration
that we apply to the raw data.
To quantify the magnitude of drifts in the energy scale
we measure the number of background events that pass
the prompt and delayed energy cuts as a function of the
energy threshold for those cuts. These event populations
are rapidly decreasing exponential functions of the energy
threshold value, so that small changes in threshold or
errors in energy scale result in fairly large changes in
the number of background events passing the cuts. By
calculating the energy threshold that would have kept
the number of passing events constant (Fig. 5(c)&(d)),
we estimate the error in energy scale.
As can be seen in Fig. 5, this error is less than 30 keV
over our 18 month data taking period. Using the mea-
sured prompt and delayed energy distributions for an-
tineutrino interactions [6], we can estimate the effect of
the remaining uncorrected gain shift on the measured
antineutrino rate (Fig. 5(e)). The effect is less than 1%
over the data taking period, considerably smaller than
the burnup effect we are attempting to observe, which is
of order 10%.
There is one important exception to the assumption
of a constant background radiation field used above, as
noted in Fig. 5(b). On November 9 of 2005, SONGS
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FIG. 5: The number of events that pass the prompt (a) and
delayed (b) energy cuts during the data taking period. In
(b) hollow circles after Nov. 9, 2005 denote the measured
delayed rate, while solid circles denote the rate corrected for
the movement of an AmBe source (the effect on the much
larger prompt rate is negligible). The inferred prompt (c)
and delayed (d) energy thresholds are determined from these
single event rates. These thresholds allow us to estimate the
relative stability of the antineutrino detection efficiency (e).
staff moved a 100 mCi Americium-Beryllium (AmBe)
neutron source (≈ 300, 000 neutrons/s) from a position
25 m around the circumference of the tendon gallery from
the detector to one 20 m away. At no time was there a
clear line of sight between this source and the detector;
however a small fraction of neutrons scattering from the
annular gallery walls reach the detector. This resulted
in an increase in the number of singles events passing
the delayed (neutron capture) energy cut. Examination
of the delayed cut singles rate with a 24 hour integra-
tion time verifies that there was a step increase on that
date, which we therefore attribute to the movement of
the AmBe source. The increase in the delayed singles
rate on that date was 550 per day (≈ 3 parts in 108 of
the neutrons emitted by the source during one day). In
assessing the detector stability, we therefore subtract this
step from dates following this event.
We are confident that the movement of the AmBe
source to this new position did not cause a significant
increase in correlated (antineutrino mimicking) back-
ground. An AmBe source could produce correlated back-
ground in two ways. First, a large fraction of neutrons
emitted by an AmBe are accompanied by a ≈ 4 MeV
gamma ray. Detection of that gamma followed by cap-
ture of the correlated neutron would produce a corre-
lated background event. The very small solid angle for
this coincidence (≈ (1/202)2), combined with the require-
ment that both the neutron and gamma scatter off the
gallery walls and traverse both the source and detector
shielding unattenuated makes this possibility vanishingly
small. Secondly, if an AmBe neutron reached the detec-
tor with sufficient energy to produce proton recoils above
the prompt energy threshold, a correlated background
event would result. This is again unlikely since the neu-
tron would lose a substantial fraction of its energy while
scattering along the gallery walls to reach the detector,
as well as traversing at least 1 m of hydrogenous ma-
terial (source plus detector shielding). Furthermore, we
observe no increase in the correlated event rate on the
date that the AmBe source was moved. The reactor re-
fueling outage that we observe began two months later,
on January 3, 2006.
We note that this external source movement event is
an example of actions that might occur during typical
operations at power and, especially, research reactors.
Careful examination of the singles and correlated events
rates allows these changing background radiation fields
to be accounted for. This also allows a means to de-
tect spoofing attempts using neutron sources like AmBe
or 252Cf that can produce correlated events. The addi-
tion of small fast and thermal neutron detectors could
further strengthen the robustness of the system against
such background variations or spoofing attempts.
We can also use correlated backgrounds as another esti-
mator of detector stability. This background is primarily
due to spallation neutrons that can mimic the antineu-
trino double coincidence signal by depositing kinetic en-
ergy in the scintillator before thermalizing and being cap-
tured on Gd. In our typical analysis, we remove many
of these events by vetoing the detector for a period of
100 µs after the passage of a muon. Instead, measuring
the rate of muon correlated events provides a measure
of the stability of the detector response for antineutrino
like events. Events within 20 µs of a muon are vetoed in
hardware, so we cannot access them. We can, however,
apply this test to events in the range 20 to 100 µs.
Using the same statistical method as that employed to
extract the antineutrino signal, we examine the distribu-
tion of double coincidence events that pass our analysis
cuts, as a function of time after last muon or acquisition
trigger. This distribution has two components, an expo-
nential decay with a time constant equal to the inverse
of the sum of muon and acquisition trigger rates (due to
random coincidences between the event pair that passes
the selection cuts and the preceding muon or trigger),
and a component at small times correlated with the pas-
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FIG. 6: Muon correlated event rate measured in the time
period 20 to 100 µs after the passage of a muon through the
veto shield. A fit with slope constrained to zero is in good
agreement with the data.
sage of the last muon (Fig. 10 of [6]). We then subtract
an exponential fit to the random coincidence background
to extract an estimate of the number of muon correlated
events that pass our cuts. In Fig. 6 we have plotted
these events in monthly bins. The distribution is well
fit by a linear function with a slope constrained to zero
(χ2 = 13.5, 16 d.o.f). While this analysis is indepen-
dent of the antineutrino flux, it is vulnerable to long term
variations in the flux of cosmic ray muons, although this
is expected to be less than 2% [17]. The analysis shows
that the variability in the detector response is small for
this class of antineutrino-like events, in comparison to the
variations observed in the actual antineutrino detection
rate (Sec. VI).
VI. OBSERVATION OF FUEL EVOLUTION
The power history of the SONGS Unit 2 reactor during
the data taking period is shown in Fig. 7a. This plot
includes the small contribution to the antineutrino rate
coming from the SONGS Unit 3 reactor. Both power
levels are scaled with their distance from the detector to
the two active reactor cores. It can be seen that SONGS
Unit 2 operated at full power for the last half of 2005
before shutting down for a refueling outage in January
of 2006. The outage lasted for almost 4 months, after
which Unit 2 returned to only 99% of full rated power –
several tubes in the reactor’s steam generators had to be
plugged due to aging, reducing the generating capacity.
It is also interesting to note that there was a two week
period in April 2006 during which both Unit 2 and Unit 3
were shutdown. During this time the correlated event
rate is due only to background – the ability to measure
the background rate only may prove to be a valuable fea-
ture for planned experiments to measure the third neu-
trino mixing angle (see, for example, [18]). Experiments
of this sort carried out at a plant with no more than two
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FIG. 7: (a) The reactor power during this same time period
as reported by the operator. (b) Observed correlated event
rate from the three detector cells used in this analysis (points)
and predicted rate based upon a rolling average of the burnup
model (solid line). (c) As in (b) but with expanded y-axis to
better demonstrate the change in the measured rate after the
refueling outage.
reactors have a reasonable chance of being able to make
such a pure background measurement, as demonstrated
here.
The correlated event rate, averaged for 30 days, mea-
sured by the 3 fully operational detector cells is plot-
ted in Fig. 7b. The correlated event rate clearly tracks
changes in reactor power that are long compared to the
averaging time; for instance, the reactor outage is clearly
visible. The reactor off period allows us to determine
the correlated background rate, which in this instance
includes the antineutrino contribution from Unit 3. Dur-
ing the 85 days when Unit 2 was off, but Unit 3 was on, a
correlated background rate of 83.7± 2.2 events/day was
measured.
Also shown in Fig. 7b is our prediction of the cor-
related event rate based upon a 30 day rolling average
of Eq. 5, using k(t) determined by our burnup model
(Sec. II C). Additionally, two parameters are determined
from the data to produce the prediction; the correlated
background rate, and a factor that accounts for the de-
tector efficiency whose determination is described below.
In Fig. 7c, the y-axis is expanded to better display the
correlated event rate when the reactor is operated at full
power. We observe a clear decrease in rate, consistent
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FIG. 8: Observed antineutrino rate plotted as function of the
number of days the reactor has operated at full power (∝ fuel
burnup). The solid curve is a one parameter fit of the rate
predicted by our reactor simulation to the data (χ2 = 13.3,
13 d.o.f).
with that expected . Compared with the rate just before
the reactor shutdown in December 2005, a rate increase
is clearly visible following reactor turn-on in June 2006.
This results from the large exchange of fissile material
that occurred during the reactor refueling. At the end
of cycle (December 2005) the reactor core contains, and
is burning, a large amount of 239Pu, and thus produces
fewer antineutrinos. During refueling, approximately one
third of the reactor fuel, containing ≈ 250 kg of 239Pu,
was removed and replaced with fresh fuel containing ≈
1.5 tons of 235U.
Since SONGS Unit 2 has been operational for many
fuel cycles, its core evolution will have reached equilib-
rium, i.e., the core evolution will be similar from cycle to
cycle. Thus we can take the data that we have collected
for the beginning and end of different cycles and plot
them as though they belonged to the same cycle (Fig. 8).
Here we have subtracted the correlated background rate,
and have scaled the rates to account for small variations
in reactor power (< 2%).
There is a clear decrease in the detected antineutrino
rate as the cumulative power produced increases. The
observed reduction is in good agreement with the predic-
tion based upon our reactor simulations – the solid curve
in Fig. 8 is a one parameter fit of the burnup model de-
scribed in Sec. II C to the data (χ2 = 13.3, 13 d.o.f).
Furthermore, the observed reduction in detected rate is
not due to any instability in our detector – the observed
reduction is of order 10%, while the detector efficiency
and correlated background rate are stable at the level of
≈ 1% (Sec. VB).
The SONGS1 detector is therefore sensitive to both the
slow change in antineutrino detection rate as the reactor
fuel evolves, and the step change in rate that occurs if
TABLE II: The change in daily antineutrino (ν¯) detection
rate that could be reliably observed by SONGS1 for a range
of observational confidence parameters. The relationship be-
tween ν¯ detection rate and fissile material quantity is scenario
dependent; in the fuel exchange (refueling) observed in this
work, replacement of ≈ 250 kg of 239Pu with ≈ 1.5 tons of
235U resulted in a detection rate change of ≈ 35 ν¯ per day.
The False Positive Rate is how often statistical fluctuations
produce an indication of a step change in the ν¯ detection
rate of the magnitude given in the table, in the absence of
any actual change in detection rate. The False Negative Rate
(FNR) is how often a true step change in the ν¯ detection rate
of the magnitude given in the table is masked by statistical
fluctuations.
False Positive Rate Change in ν¯ detection rate
FNR = 1 in 10 FNR = 5 in 10
1 in 103 11.6 9.1
1 in 104 12.9 10.2
1 in 105 14.2 11.5
fuel is replaced.
Assigning a sensitivity in terms of fissile mass is dif-
ficult as these changes in detection rate do not directly
relate to a particular change in fuel isotopics. To provide
an indication of our sensitivity to sudden changes in fuel
isotopics, e.g. the undeclared replacement of spent fuel,
we have performed a Monte Carlo study to determine the
change in the antineutrino detection rate that could be
reliably observed by the SONGS1 detector.
In this study, the SONGS1 antineutrino detection rate
was simulated throughout a 600 day fuel cycle. At
day 300 in the cycle, the antineutrino detection rate is
increased, as it would if Pu laden fuel were exchanged
for fresh fuel. For each value of the step change in rate
100, 000 simulated experiments were conducted, sam-
pling from gaussian distributions to represent the sys-
tematic uncertainty in our knowledge of thermal power
(0.5%) and the magnitude of the burnup effect (3%), as
well as the statistical fluctuation of the antineutrino de-
tection rate, and a χ2 distribution generated. Compar-
ison of these distributions to that generated with zero
step allows us to estimate the change in antineutrino de-
tection rate required to observe such a change (Table II).
For comparison, the step change that occurs at refuelling,
when ≈ 250 kg of 239Pu is replaced with ≈ 1.5 tons of
235U, is ≈ 35 counts per day.
VII. CONCLUSION
The SONGS1 data demonstrate a clear correlation
between the changes in the reactor antineutrino emis-
sion rate and the evolution of the reactor power and
fissile inventory. While the sensitivity differs according
to the specific fuel loading and operating history, our
data and simulations show that changes in antineutrino
rate throughout a fuel cycle, including both rate “slope”
and “step” information, can be used in conjunction with
9power declarations to constrain the amount of 239Pu be-
ing produced or removed at the level of about 100 kg.
High-statistics antineutrino rate measurements of the
kind presented here can be used to quantitatively ver-
ify operator inventory and operating history declara-
tions, complementing the containment and surveillance
based approach that prevails in the current IAEA reac-
tor safeguards regime. Comparison of the antineutrino
rate changes from fuel cycle to fuel cycle also provides
independent verification that the reactor is being run in
a consistent fashion across cycles. Since in this case only
self-consistency of the antineutrino measurements across
cycles is demanded, such an approach reduces depen-
dence on operator declarations.
The SONGS1 deployment has also demonstrated that
an antineutrino detector can be operated stably and
without interruption or maintenance for many months
to a year or longer, using background gamma rays as
the sole means of calibration, and with remote real-time
retrieval of data and detector state-of health informa-
tion. With appropriate protection against tampering,
this makes remote quantitative verification of reactor op-
erations possible, and may thereby allow a reduction in
the frequency of site visits by IAEA or other inspectors.
Further work must be done to study specific scenarios,
and to consider safeguards tasks of particular interest
to the IAEA, such as the study of different reactor types
and power ratings. In terms of detector development, fur-
ther improvements in precision and ease of operation are
being pursued through iterations on the current detec-
tor design. Ultimately, complete independence from dec-
larations may be made possible through measurements
of the antineutrino energy spectrum, using a somewhat
more sophisticated detector.
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